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Abstract
Recent waves of immigration have changed the demographic face of European societies and fueled
considerable debate over the consequences of ethnic diversity for social cohesion. One prominent ar-
gument in this debate holds that individuals are less willing to extend trust and solidarity across eth-
nic lines, leading to lower social capital in multiethnic communities. We present a direct test of this
proposition in a field experiment involving native-immigrant interactions in Zurich’s Central Train
Station. Our intervention consists of approaching commuters with a small request for assistance (bor-
rowing a mobile phone), which we take as a measure of prosociality. We further differentiate between
reactions towards natives as well as both high- and low-status immigrant groups. Compared to na-
tive-native interactions, we find lower solidarity in native-immigrant encounters, especially in cases
involving stereotypically low-status immigrants. In exploratory analyses, we further show that dis-
crimination only obtains in ’low cost’ situations where commuters could easily justify not helping (e.g.
by claiming not to carry a phone). Overall our results shed light on key theoretical mechanisms under-
lying patterns of solidarity in contemporary multiethnic societies.
Introduction
Recent waves of immigration have changed the demo-
graphic face of European societies. According to official
data from the European Commission, first- and second-
generation immigrants now comprise between 20 per
cent and 30 per cent of the population in countries such
as France, Britain, and Germany (Eurostat, 2015).
While immigration flows have contributed positively to
economic growth, innovation, and competitiveness
(Surowiecki, 2005; Putnam, 2007; Page, 2008; Lorenz
et al., 2011), these demographic shifts have also fueled
public anxieties and considerable academic debate about
the potentially negative consequences of ethnic diversity
for social solidarity in immigrant-receiving countries
(for recent reviews, see Stichnoth and van der Straeten,
2013; Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014; Schaeffer, 2016;
Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2018).
One prominent argument linking diversity to un-
desirable collective outcomes holds that individuals are
less willing to extend trust and solidarity across ethnic
lines, leading to lower social capital in multiethnic com-
munities (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Schaeffer,
2013; Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2015; Koopmans and
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 35, No. 4, 582–597
doi: 10.1093/esr/jcz030
Advance Access Publication Date: 7 June 2019
Original Article
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/article-abstract/35/4/582/5512302 by U
niversity of Zurich user on 23 Septem
ber 2019
Schaeffer, 2015). However, while much of the diversity
literature simply assumes that the scope of prosociality
is ethnically bounded, only a handful of studies have
sought to test this proposition directly in the European
context (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004; Ahmed, 2010;
Diekmann, Jann and Na¨f, 2014; Koopmans and Veit,
2014; Cettolin and Suetens, 2018).1 Further, extant
studies have typically focused on interactions between
natives and members of stereotypically disadvantaged
immigrant groups.2 In contrast, we know little about
natives’ reactions towards non-disadvantaged groups.
In this article, we present evidence from a field ex-
periment documenting patterns of prosocial behaviour
in interactions involving both low- and high-status im-
migrant groups. Our approach combines the traditional
strengths of experimentation (random assignment to
treatment) with a realistic intervention and unobtrusive
measurement of behaviour (Baldassarri and Abascal,
2017). We contribute to the diversity literature by dir-
ectly testing the extent to which prosociality in real-life
encounters is conditioned upon the ethnicity of one’s
interaction partners. Moreover, we examine the extent
to which individuals treat stereotypically high- versus
low-status immigrant groups differently. As such, our
work engages more broadly with scholarship looking
beyond the monolithic (i.e. ‘color-blind’) effects of diver-
sity to understand how immigrants’ characteristics influ-
ence cross-ethnic relations (Be´cares et al., 2011;
Laurence, 2011; Bakker and Dekker, 2012; Hainmueller
and Hangartner, 2013; Gundelach and Traunmu¨ller,
2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Turper et al.,
2015; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016;
Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Diehl et al., 2018;
Winter and Zhang, 2018; Ward, 2019).
To test the proposition that prosociality is ethnically
bounded, we specifically examine the behaviour of na-
tive Swiss towards both native and non-native residents
of Switzerland. The Swiss setting is notable in that it
allows us to study natives’ interactions with both
‘generic’ (low-status) immigrants and (high-status)
German nationals who constitute a sizable and politic-
ally salient minority (Helbling, 2011; Diehl et al.,
2018). Our experimental intervention consists of
approaching commuters in Zurich’s Central Train
Station and asking for assistance (borrowing a mobile
phone to make a local call), which we take as a measure
of prosociality. Confederates systematically varied the
dialect in which this request was made in order to signal
either a Swiss, German, or ‘generic’ (low-status) immi-
grant identity. This innovative feature of our design
allows us to estimate the causal effect of ethnicity while
holding constant idiosyncratic factors that may vary
across confederates.
Results from 863 trials involving native Swiss com-
muters demonstrate a discernable pattern of anti-
foreigner bias: controlling for confederate-level fixed
effects, speaking in a non-Swiss dialect or accent signifi-
cantly decreases the likelihood of receiving help.
Moreover, while we find evidence of discrimination
directed against confederates posing as (high-status)
Germans, the ethnic penalty is substantively larger and
more robust for ‘generic’ (low-status) immigrants. These
results indicate that ethnic boundaries do indeed play a
role in explaining the oft-cited negative association be-
tween diversity and social cohesion, although diversity’s
detrimental effects may be largely driven by natives’
aversion towards stereotypically low-status groups
(Schaub, Gereke and Baldassarri, forthcoming).
In exploratory analyses, we further show that anti-
foreigner bias only obtains in experimental trials involv-
ing commuters who could plausibly deny carrying a mo-
bile phone. In contrast, we detect no treatment effects in
interventions with commuters whose phones were al-
ready visible when approached by confederates. This last
result speaks to the role of situational factors in determin-
ing the ‘costs’ of discrimination (Merton, 1948; Crosby,
Bromley and Saxe, 1980; Duckitt, 1992). More specifical-
ly, discrimination in our experiment appears to occur
only in situations where individuals could easily justify
not helping (e.g. by claiming not to carry a phone).
Theory, Prior Evidence, and Hypotheses
The relationship between ethnic diversity and social co-
hesion has been extensively studied by scholars across
the social sciences. Recent meta-analyses point to a
modest yet consistent negative effect of diversity on col-
lective outcomes (Stichnoth and van der Straeten, 2013;
Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014; Schaeffer, 2016;
Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2018). One mechanism fre-
quently invoked by scholars to explain this association
relates to the role of in-group biases in prosocial behav-
iour (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Yamagishi, Jin and
Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008; Balliet,
Wu and De Dreu, 2014). Specifically, humans are
argued to possess a psychological disposition to create
social categories that partition in-group versus out-
group members and to espouse attitudes and behaviours
that positively differentiate the in-group. Signals of
shared group membership thus cue behavioural biases to
be generous, extend trust, and cooperate in social
dilemmas.
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In multiethnic societies, such group biases may
hamper cooperation to the extent that group bounda-
ries are constructed along ethnic or national lines. For
instance, it has been argued that individuals derive
non-pecuniary benefits when co-ethnics are made bet-
ter off, but remain indifferent to the welfare of non-
co-ethnics (Habyarimana et al., 2007: p. 710). Other
authors have posited that individuals may be better
able to read the intentions and feelings of co-ethnics,
with greater empathy promoting the extension of trust
within ethnic boundaries (Dinesen and Sønderskov,
2015: pp. 552–553). A third line of research holds
that shared ethnicity facilitates the enforcement of so-
cial norms which help to sustain cooperation and curb
free-riding within the group (Fearon and Laitin, 1996;
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007;
Algan, He´met and Laitin, 2016). In summary, a di-
verse body of literature suggests a prominent ethnic di-
mension to the process of social categorization and in-
group cooperation.
Of course, the precise location of ethnic boundaries
is likely to vary from society to society depending on the
dominant frames supplied by politics and the popular
media (Posner, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005;
Wimmer, 2008; Hopkins, 2010).3 In contemporary
European societies, such major fault lines are most likely
to appear between the majority native population and
minorities of foreign descent. Moreover, while the over-
arching European discourse tends to focus on typically
low-skilled migrants from non-Western countries, the
specific Swiss context in which our study is embedded is
notable in that high-skilled immigration from the EU—
and in particular Germany—has also been the subject of
much political debate (Helbling, 2011; Freitag, Vatter
and Mueller, 2015; Diehl et al., 2018).4 Given this con-
figuration of politicized groups in Switzerland, we pre-
dict that salient group boundaries exist between native
Swiss on the one hand, and both ‘generic’ (low-status)
immigrants and high-status Germans on the other.
These boundaries should manifest in lower levels of pro-
sociality displayed by members of the majority Swiss
population towards both non-native groups:
H1: Natives are less prosocial towards immigrants than
towards fellow natives.
The proposition that prosocial behaviour is ethnical-
ly bounded has been widely cited in the literature to ex-
plain the observed negative relationship between ethnic
diversity and social cohesion (Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002;
Habyarimana et al., 2007; Schaeffer, 2013; Dinesen and
Sønderskov, 2015; Koopmans and Schaeffer, 2015). Yet
so far only a handful of studies have attempted to test
whether individuals do indeed condition their behaviour
on the migration background of their interaction part-
ners. One approach in this line of research uses behav-
ioural games to measure prosociality while exogenously
manipulating the identity of the opposing party. For in-
stance, Cettolin and Suetens (2018) administer a trust
game with a nationally representative sample in the
Netherlands and find that native Dutch are less trust-
worthy when matched with a ‘non-Western’ immigrant.
In contrast, Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) find no effect
of ethnicity on either trust or reciprocity among Flemish
and Turkish small-business owners in Ghent, Belgium
using a similar experimental paradigm.
Other researchers have employed field experiments to
measure prosociality in ‘natural’ encounters where sub-
jects are unaware of their participation in an ongoing
study. One example involves the use of the ‘lost-letter’
technique (Milgram, Mann and Harter, 1965) which
records the rate at which letters dispersed in public places
are picked up and forwarded to their intended recipients.
Employing this technique in Sweden, Ahmed (2010) finds
that letters addressed to individuals with Muslim names
were less likely to be returned compared to letters con-
taining Swedish names.5 Other studies have attempted to
measure prosociality directly via interpersonal helping be-
haviour. For instance, Diekmann, Jann and Na¨f (2014)
record the frequency by which Zurich residents provided
money to a confederate ostensibly needing to purchase a
bus ticket. Using a treatment manipulation similar to
ours, these authors vary the dialect (Swiss-German vs.
High German, corresponding to the dialect spoken in
Germany) in which the request was phrased, but find no
effect of German identity on helping rates.
One distinguishing feature of those aforementioned
studies which do find affirmative evidence of anti-
immigrant bias relates to the specific characteristics of
the immigrant groups considered. For example, Cettolin
and Suetens (2018) focus on non-Western immigration
to the Netherlands, which is predominantly comprised
of population flows from Morocco, Turkey and the for-
mer Dutch colonies (Bakker and Dekker, 2012).
Importantly, these groups are stereotypically associated
with low socio-economic status and educational attain-
ment relative to native Dutch (Heath, Rothon and Kilpi,
2008). Similar characterizations could also be made of
immigrants from Muslim-majority countries living in
Sweden (Snellman and Ekehammar, 2005). By contrast,
Diekmann, Jann and Na¨f (2014) consider relatively
equal status groups (Swiss and Germans). In a similar
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vein, Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) interpret their null
results in light of the fact that Turkish and Belgian partic-
ipants were recruited from the same socio-professional
ranks such that status differences were likely minimized.
This pattern of findings suggests that prosociality is
likely to be particularly inhibited in interactions involv-
ing low-status immigrants. In fact, immigrants’ socio-
economic status has been identified as a key moderator
of their acceptance by the host society. Specifically, sur-
vey research on immigration-related attitudes consistent-
ly finds that while poorly educated, low-skilled
foreigners tend to bear the brunt of exclusionary senti-
ments, the presence of high-status ‘expatriates’ appears
far less controversial (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015;
Turper et al., 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller and
Hangartner, 2016; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017;
Diehl et al., 2018; Ward, 2019).
These findings resonate with prominent theories of
intergroup conflict (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Bobo
and Hutchings, 1996) linking interethnic tensions to pub-
lic concerns over the adverse economic impacts of immi-
gration (Quillian, 1995; Semyonov, Raijman and
Gorodzeisky, 2006; Schneider, 2008; Hainmueller and
Hiscox, 2010; Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013;
Dancygier and Laitin, 2014). Under this view, immigrants
provoke opposition to the extent that they threaten native
jobs and increase tax burdens. While natives may be more
welcoming of high-status immigrants who are perceived
as better able to contribute to the economy, negative
views of low-status immigrants may serve to inhibit cross-
ethnic solidarity towards these groups in particular.
A complementary mechanism relates anti-immigrant
attitudes to concerns about criminality (Fitzgerald,
Curtis and Corliss, 2012). Such concerns may be particu-
larly relevant in our experiment in which the decision to
render assistance introduces a risk of one’s phone being
stolen. Prosocial behaviour in our context thus involves
an important element of trust in confederates’ benign
intentions. Moreover, such trust may be particularly
lacking with respect to low-status immigrants who are
more likely to be associated with stereotypes about crim-
inal behaviour (Ward, 2019), or who may otherwise be
perceived as having a greater incentive to steal the phone.
To the extent that such beliefs manifest in a reluctance to
help others in strategic situations, this perspective as well
suggests that prosociality will be particularly inhibited
towards low-status immigrant groups:
H2: Beyond a general anti-foreigner bias, natives are
less prosocial towards members of low-status immigrant
groups than towards high-status groups.
We wish to highlight here that our hypotheses con-
cern the behaviour of natives only. In contrast, we make
no predictions about the behaviour of immigrants, even
though arguments about the ethnic dimension of in-
group favoritism and ethnic competition have been
applied to both majority and minority groups outside of
Europe.6 While we acknowledge the importance of
immigrants’ contribution to the overall pattern of social
cohesion in multi-ethnic communities, we believe that
there are important conceptual reasons for focusing on
natives’ behaviour in the context of the European immi-
gration debate. More specifically, though natives may
readily differentiate fellow natives from immigrants, the
precise shape of group boundaries is less clear a priori
from a non-native perspective. For example, non-natives
may view themselves as members of (i) an encompassing
‘immigrant’ social category, (ii) distinct ethnic or nation-
al groups—e.g. ‘Tamils’, or (iii) some intermediate
grouping such as ‘Southern Europeans’ (Wimmer,
2004). In some cases, more established immigrants may
even consider natives as part of their own in-group.
Given the unclear location of group boundaries with re-
spect to immigrants, we choose to focus our attention
on the behaviour of natives alone in testing the more
general theoretical ideas discussed above.
Methods
Experimental Protocol
Our field experiment was conducted on two under-
ground platforms in Zurich’s Central Train Station.
Confederates approached single commuters waiting on
the platform7 and explained that they had just missed
their train and were consequently going to be late for a
local appointment. Further, confederates stated that
they wished to phone ahead to alert their meeting part-
ner of their tardiness, but unfortunately their own phone
had just run out of power. After telling this ‘cover story’,
confederates showed commuters a piece of paper on
which were written a name and local landline number.8
Finally, confederates requested to borrow the commut-
er’s cell phone to place the call.
A research assistant stood approximately three
meters away from this interaction and discretely
recorded commuters’ responses using a smart-phone app.
We coded as prosocial any behaviour ranging from hand-
ing over one’s phone, to offering to call on the confeder-
ate’s behalf, to soliciting the aid of third persons. We
also coded whether commuters were holding a cell phone
prior to being approached by our confederate, as it
European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 35, No. 4 585
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would ostensibly be harder to justify turning down a re-
quest for assistance in such circumstances.9 Finally, re-
search assistants were instructed to collect additional
information on the gender and approximate age of the
commuter, and to make their best guess as to the com-
muter’s nationality or ethnic background based on ac-
cent and physical appearance. We use this latter
information to identify the subsample of native Swiss
commuters which forms the core of our analysis.
In all, we recruited seven professional actors (five fe-
male and two male) as confederates for our study. Six of
the seven actors looked to be of working age (30–50years
old), while one actor was of retirement age (70 years old).
Actors’ profiles are provided in Supplementary Figure S1.
Confederates were instructed to dress ‘naturally’ such that
commuters would feel comfortable when approached;
however, clothing could vary slightly depending on the
actor and day of the experiment. Interventions were
staged in the morning between 8: 00 and 11: 00 and in
the afternoon between 15: 30 and 18: 30 on various
weekdays (Monday to Friday) over the period 15 May to
6 September 2018 (see Supplementary Tables S1–S3). We
instructed confederates to conduct an intervention only if
a train departure was not imminent in order to avoid cut-
ting short the interaction. After each intervention, re-
search assistants approached commuters for debriefing.
Commuters were informed that, should they so wish, it
was possible to delete their data from our analysis (only
two people requested we do so). Our experimental proce-
dures were approved by the University of Zurich’s
Institutional Review Board.
Treatment Conditions
Confederates were instructed to approach commuters
using either (i) Swiss-German dialect (Schweizerdeutsch),
(ii) High German (Hochdeutsch), which corresponds to
the ‘standard’ version of German spoken in Germany, or
(iii) imperfect German with a detectable accent. In online
pretests, we determined that both Schweizerdeutsch and
Hochdeutsch were easily recognizable by Zurich resi-
dents and readily associated with their respective nation-
al groups. In contrast, our online sample found it almost
impossible to accurately distinguish between different
‘immigrant’ accents (e.g. Eastern European vs. Iberian vs.
Turkish). As such, we allowed our confederates to freely
use any immigrant accent in which they felt comfortable
playing their role.10
We wish to highlight that our experimental manipu-
lation is designed to measure reactions towards different
non-native groups. In principle, an alternative design
could have investigated how prosociality is shaped by
individual-level status signals (e.g. dressing up and
down). We note however that in-group favoritism and
group competition theory derive their predictions from
group-level dynamics. In other words, the theory holds
that individuals experience discrimination by virtue of
their membership in a(n) (high- or low-status) immi-
grant group, and not because they are perceived to be in-
dividually rich or poor. We thus opted for a group-level
status manipulation in order to more faithfully capture
the theoretical concepts of interest.
That said, our design is not without potential draw-
backs, two of which we address here. First, commuters
may not associate imperfectly spoken German with
socio-economic disadvantage. To address this issue, we
conducted a preliminary survey experiment with an on-
line sample of Swiss train commuters from the Zurich
region. Further details on the implementation of the sur-
vey can be found in Supplementary Section S2. Survey
respondents were presented with a series of pictures of
our confederates matched with real voice samples of the
actors reading a set of simple phrases. The voice samples
existed in three distinct versions, corresponding to our
three linguistic treatments. Respondents listened to one
randomly assigned voice sample from each confederate,
and then rated that confederate in terms of socio-
economic status.11 This procedure allows us to estimate
how perceptions of each confederate vary as a function
of the dialects used by the actual actors in the field
experiment.
Figure 1A displays the distribution of socio-economic
status ratings across the three dialects (n ¼ 882 ratings
provided by 126 native Swiss respondents).12 We have
standardized and doubly-demeaned the data by (i) each
confederate’s average rating elicited across all dialects,
and (ii) the average rating provided by each respondent
across all profiles. This allows us to focus on the effect of
dialect independently of both respondent-specific charac-
teristics and idiosyncratic factors related to individual
actors. We observe that confederates are rated as having
significantly lower status when speaking with an imper-
fect German accent, as compared against either
Schweizerdeutsch (b ¼0.77, P<0.001) or Hochdeutsch
(b ¼ 0.67, P< 0.001). (The full regression models under-
lying these results are presented in Supplementary Table
S6). Further, the distributions of ratings attached to
Schweizerdeutsch and Hochdeutsch are statistically indis-
tinguishable from each other (b ¼ 0.10, P¼0.26). In
summary, the survey experiment provides evidence that
our linguistic treatments do indeed convey the intended
status connotations.
A second issue relates to the possibility that our
group-level manipulation may also affect factors other
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than socio-economic status. This raises the potential
concern that high-status Germans may indeed receive
differential treatment, but not because of their status per
se. In the context of intergroup relations, the most plaus-
ible alternative mechanism relates to the concept of cul-
tural distance (Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky,
2006; Dancygier and Laitin, 2014). Specifically, since
Germans could be considered culturally similar to native
Swiss, they may be better liked, and thus elicit greater
prosociality in comparison to other immigrants. That
said, prior studies have argued that Swiss actually con-
sider Germans to be a salient ‘cultural threat’ despite
superficial similarities and dislike them as a consequence
(see Helbling, 2011 and citations therein).
We test an implication of this cultural threat idea via
an additional item drawn from our pre-experimental
survey measuring the likability of confederates employ-
ing different dialects.13 As before, we standardize and
doubly demean the data. The results are presented in
Figure 1B. We observe that in comparison to
Schweizerdeutsch, confederates are rated as significantly
less likable when employing either an imperfect German
accent (b ¼ 0.56, P<0.001) or Hochdeutsch (b ¼
0.43, P<0.001) (see also Supplementary Table S6).
Further, while confederates are rated as slightly more
likable when speaking Hochdeutsch compared to imper-
fect German, this difference is substantively small and
only marginally significant (b ¼ 0.13, P¼ 0.08). In
other words, our survey indicates that our field experi-
mental treatment consists mainly of manipulating per-
ceptions of socio-economic status, while Germans’
putative cultural similarity to Swiss does little to in-
crease their likability over other immigrants.
With this information in hand, we proceeded to
train the confederates in accordance with the afore-
mentioned experimental protocol. Particular emphasis
during training was placed on the relevance of display-
ing identical behaviour (e.g. in terms of cover story,
body language or friendliness) across all treatments.
We stressed that it was of utmost importance to avoid
influencing the likelihood of receiving help by acting
differently in each role. In addition, confederates were
instructed to voice their request in a clearly compre-
hensible manner when using the imperfect German ac-
cent to mitigate concerns that native Swiss may be less
helpful because they simply do not understand the con-
federate’s request.14 We believe that our employment
of professional actors contributed significantly to the
success of the training.
Confederates systematically rotated through all of
the dialects according to a pre-specified schedule. Each
confederate was assigned to work six separate 3-hour
shifts, consisting of two shifts per dialect. Dialects were
assigned to confederates at the beginning of each shift
and were retained throughout the shift’s duration. We
implemented this procedure because we determined in
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Figure 1. Distribution of socio-economic status and likability ratings by dialect
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of (standardized) socio-economic status and likability ratings from our pre-experimental
survey of native Swiss train commuters from the Zurich region. Large and significant status differences exist between confederates
employing an imperfect German accent versus either Schweizerdeutsch or Hochdeutsch. In contrast, the difference in likability be-
tween imperfect German and Hochdeutsch is substantively small and only marginally significant.
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pretests that switching dialects after every trial dis-
tracted confederates from focusing on other aspects of
their role.
Data Description
Overall, we collected information on 1,198 experimen-
tal interventions. In the main text, we report on analyses
using data from 863 trials involving commuters whom
we identified as native Swiss based on appearance and
accent. (A description of the full dataset is presented in
Supplementary Table S7). As discussed above, we focus
on this restricted sample of native Swiss because we lack
clear theoretical predictions about the behaviour of non-
natives. Additionally, we do not have sufficient power
to analyze non-native commuters separately.
Nonetheless, we do replicate all of our analyses using
the full sample (n¼ 1,198) for robustness (see
Supplementary Table S12).
Table 1 displays the number of interventions involv-
ing the subset of native Swiss commuters conducted in
each of the three dialects: (i) Schweizerdeutsch (Native),
(ii) Hochdeutsch (high-status immigrant), and (iii) im-
perfect German (low-status immigrant). Overall, 50.5
per cent of the native Swiss sample is male, and the sam-
ple spans all age ranges. Approximately 48 per cent of
commuters were observed to be holding a mobile phone
when approached by confederates. Table 1 also com-
pares the distribution of these characteristics across lan-
guage treatments and displays corresponding P values
from Pearson chi-squared tests. We see that there are no
statistically significant differences in basic commuter
characteristics across treatments, suggesting that overall
our confederates did not systematically choose to engage
with different types of commuters depending upon the
dialect they adopted.
Results
Native Swiss commuters rendered assistance in 68 per
cent of all interventions (586 out of 863 trials).
Prosocial behaviour was elicited more frequently by con-
federates posing as Natives (74 per cent), in comparison
to trials employing any non-Native accent (65 per cent).
A chi-squared test reveals this difference to be statistical-
ly significant (n¼ 863, v(1)2 ¼ 7.39, P¼ 0.007). We also
estimate regression models of the likelihood of receiving
help with actor-fixed effects (see Supplementary Table
S8). These models allow us to capture the average differ-
ence in helping rates between Native and non-Native
treatments holding confederates’ characteristics con-
stant. Results are substantively similar (b ¼ 0.10,
P¼ 0.002) and provide evidence in support of H1: na-
tive Swiss are less prosocial towards immigrants than to-
wards fellow natives.
To test H2, we examine natives’ behaviour towards
high- and low-status immigrants separately. The results
are shown in Figure 2A. We see that commuters do in-
deed differentiate between different immigrant groups:
confederates employing Hochdeutsch (simulating a
high-status immigrant) were helped 69 per cent of the
time, compared to 61 per cent in trials involving the use
of imperfect German (simulating a low-status immi-
grant). (Recall the helping rate elicited by confederates
posing as natives is 74 per cent). To more rigorously
examine these differences, we estimate linear probability
Table 1. Descriptive statistics in the native Swiss sample, and across treatments
Variable Pooled treatments Treatments conditions: v2(2) P
Native High Low
Male 50.5 50.3 50.6 50.7 0.008 0.996
Age category
18-25 21.6 21.4 20.7 22.5 0.258 0.879
26-35 23.2 24.4 21.8 23.1 0.501 0.778
36-45 15.6 14.9 18.0 14.3 1.633 0.442
46-55 18.1 19.8 16.1 18.0 1.316 0.518
56þ 21.6 19.5 23.4 22.1 1.347 0.510
Holding phone 48.0 44.5 49.4 50.3 2.386 0.303
Observations 863 308 261 294
Notes: The table lists the mean of each variable calculated for the sample of native Swiss commuters, as well as within each of the treatment groups. High-Status
Immigrant is denoted by “High” and Low-Status Immigrant by “Low,” respectively. To test that the variables are balanced across treatment groups, we also display
the test statistic from Pearson chi-squared tests with two degrees of freedom and the associated P values. There are no statistically significant differences across
treatments.
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models (LPM) of the likelihood of receiving assistance
with confederate-level fixed effects.15 Our main ex-
planatory variables consist of dummies denoting
whether the intervention took place in Hochdeutsch
(high-status immigrant) or imperfect German (low-sta-
tus immigrant), treating interventions conducted in
Schweizerdeutsch as the baseline.
Model 1 of Table 2 displays the results of the basic
fixed effects regression. We see that the coefficients on
both high-status and low-status immigrant treatments
are negatively signed. However, only the coefficient on
low-status Immigrant is statistically significant: on aver-
age, low-status immigrants are helped about 13.6 per-
centage points less than native Swiss (P< 0.001), while
the penalty with respect to high-status Germans is only
5.6 percentage points (P¼0.147). The model also indi-
cates a significant difference between the two immigrant
groups of around 8 percentage points (P¼0.04; see
Model 1 in Supplementary Table S10). Overall, we take
these findings as evidence in support of H2: natives are
less prosocial towards members of low-status immigrant
groups than towards high-status groups.
Model 2 of Table 2 adds controls for the gender and
age of commuters, as well as the date and time at which
interventions took place (for brevity, we do not display
these coefficients in the main text. Interested readers are
referred to Supplementary Table S9). In Model 3, we
additionally control for whether the commuter was
holding a mobile phone when approached by the con-
federate. This coefficient is positive and highly
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Figure 2. Helping rates across treatment conditions for different types of encounters
Note: High-Status Immigrant is denoted by ‘High’ and low-status Immigrant by ‘Low’, respectively.
Table 2. Regression results of helping behaviour for the native Swiss sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment:
Native ref. ref. ref. ref.
High-Status Immigrant 0.056 0.059 0.068þ 0.154**
(1.45) (1.45) (1.69) (2.85)
Low-Status Immigrant 0.136*** 0.124** 0.132*** 0.228***
(3.68) (3.09) (3.32) (4.36)
Phone visible 0.152*** 0.022
(4.70) (0.42)
High-Status x Phone 0.189*
(2.47)
Low-Status x Phone 0.209**
(2.87)
Constant 0.742*** 0.752*** 0.669*** 0.730***
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
N 863 863 863 863
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from linear probability models with t-statistics in parentheses (þP < 0.1, *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001, for two-
sided tests). All models are estimated with confederate fixed effects. Models 2 through 4 include controls for commuters’ gender and approximate age, as well as the
month, day of the week, and time of day during which the intervention was conducted. Full results are reported in Supplementary Table S9.
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significant, suggesting that it is indeed more difficult to
turn down requests for assistance under these circum-
stances.16 Comparing Model 1 to Models 2 and 3, the
empirical picture is slightly altered as the coefficient on
high-status immigrant increases in size and reaches mar-
ginal statistical significance in Model 3. In contrast, the
difference between the high-status and low-status immi-
grant treatments shrinks slightly, and its statistical sig-
nificance falls just outside the 10 per cent level
(see Supplementary Table S10). We stress, however,
that the main message from Model 1 remains un-
changed by the inclusion of covariates: we detect a ro-
bust anti-foreigner bias for low-status immigrants, and
a weaker and more fragile ethnic penalty for high-status
Germans.
We conduct additional exploratory analyses to
examine whether our treatment effects themselves may
vary by whether commuters were holding a phone when
approached by confederates. We believe that the visible
presence of a cell phone may moderate our results inso-
far as it is easier to discriminate or behave uncivically if
one can plausibly deny having the ability to help (e.g. by
claiming not to carry a phone). We note, however, that
this aspect of the analysis was not a part of our original
experimental design, and thus we did not block treat-
ment assignment on whether a phone was visible.
Nonetheless, approximately half of all interventions
occurred under such circumstances, and the proportion
of commuters carrying phones is roughly similar across
our treatment conditions (see Table 1).
Model 4 of Table 2 includes an interaction between
our linguistic treatments and a dummy variable denoting
if the commuter was holding a phone. The treatment
coefficients are now interpreted as the effect of dialect in
the subset of interventions where no phone was visible
(n¼ 449). Under these circumstances, we estimate that
high-status and low-status immigrants are about 15 and
23 percentage points less likely to receive assistance, re-
spectively (see Figure 2B). Both effects are statistically
significant and substantively larger than the pooled
results reported in Models 1 through 3. The positive and
significant interaction effects reported in Model 4 indi-
cate that the anti-foreigner penalty is mitigated in the
subset of interventions where a cell phone was visible
(n¼ 414). As shown in Figure 2C, helping rates are not
significantly different across treatments under these
circumstances. This is also confirmed in a parallel
regression where we set phone visible as the baseline
category (see Supplementary Table S11).
To summarize, our analysis yields evidence in sup-
port of both H1 and H2. Native Swiss are less prosocial
towards immigrants, and this effect is driven by particu-
larly low helping rates elicited in the low-status condi-
tion. Additionally, we explored the extent to which our
treatments are moderated by situational factors which
plausibly affect the ‘costs’ of discrimination (for ex-
ample, by making it harder to turn down a request for
assistance). We find that the (limited) anti-foreigner dis-
crimination we detect in the main analysis is magnified
in cases where commuters can plausibly justify their de-
cision not to help. In contrast, when an easy justifica-
tion is unavailable, treatment effects disappear entirely.
Interestingly, phone visibility has no effect on prosocial-
ity towards native Swiss, as shown by the substantively
small and statistically insignificant coefficient on the
Phone Visible dummy in Model 4 of Table 2. Our inter-
pretation is that situational factors do not so much in-
fluence prosocial decision-making per se (cf. Dana,
Weber and Kuang, 2007), but rather seem to moderate
specifically the extent to which anti-foreigner bias man-
ifests in individual behaviour (Merton, 1948; Crosby,
Bromley and Saxe, 1980; Duckitt, 1992).
Finally, we conduct a battery of additional robust-
ness checks and briefly report on the results here. Full
tables are available in the Supplementary Materials.
First, we replicate our results using the full dataset of
1,198 interventions17 in place of the reduced native
Swiss sample (Supplementary Table S12). Along these
lines, we also examine separately the behaviour of non-
native commuters (Supplementary Table S13). While we
lack sufficient observations to draw meaningful infer-
ences (n¼ 310), an exploratory analysis suggests that
non-native commuters actually seem to reproduce the
discriminatory patterns we observe amongst natives (al-
though none of the coefficients reach conventional sig-
nificance levels). In particular, the direction of the
coefficients indicates that discrimination is targeted
against low-status immigrants even within the restricted
non-native sample. We will return to the substantive
implications of these preliminary results in the conclud-
ing discussion.
In additional robustness checks, we replicate our
main analysis using logistic regressions instead of the
LPM (Supplementary Table S14). We also re-run our
analyses using the decision to physically hand over one’s
phone to the confederate as an alternative operationali-
zation of the dependent variable (Supplementary Table
S15). Arguably, this decision provides stronger evidence
of prosociality, as it involves elements of both altruism
and trust (e.g. that the confederate will not run away
with the phone). Finally, we check the sensitivity of our
results to the influence of individual confederates by
dropping confederates one at a time from our analysis
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(Supplementary Figure S2). None of these changes ap-
preciably alters our conclusions.
Addressing Additional Concerns
In this section, we discuss additional issues pertaining to
the internal and external validity of our findings. First,
Heckman and Siegelman (1993) have expressed con-
cerns that confederates in field experiments may private-
ly infer the purpose of the research and consequently
alter their behaviour to subtly influence the results.
While we cannot definitively rule out this possibility, we
stress that our training emphasized the importance of
maintaining consistent behaviour across all trials. We
further highlight that our experiment employed multiple
confederates, such that biases introduced by a single in-
dividual are unlikely to tilt the overall results. Finally,
Pager (2003) attempts to quantify the scope of Heckman
and Siegelman’s critique in the context of employment
discrimination by comparing trials employing real actors
versus fictitious resumes (where there was no scope for
confederates to influence the results). Pager actually
finds lower discrimination in cases of direct interaction,
which is the opposite result as expected by Heckman
and Siegelman. Together, we believe that these consider-
ations help to mitigate related concerns in the context of
our study.
A second issue relates to the generalizability of our
findings across situational domains. More specifically,
the present study has examined prosociality in the con-
text of a strategic interaction wherein helping the con-
federate introduces a risk of exploitation (e.g. by
having one’s phone stolen). We believe that such situa-
tions are inherently different from more unilateral
‘altruism’ scenarios represented by donations to charity
or behaviour in a dictator game where little scope for
opportunism exists. In the latter, notions of fairness
may be highly salient, leading individuals to display
greater prosociality towards low-income targets (Katz,
Cohen and Glass, 1975; Liebe and Tutic, 2010; Van
Doesum, Tybur and Van Lange, 2017). In contrast,
such fairness concerns are absent from our study,
where the ‘need for help’ is constant for members of
both high-status and low-status immigrant groups.
Instead, our experimental context may have increased
the salience of stereotypes associating low-status immi-
grants with criminality. In such situations, we find
greater discrimination against members of low-status
groups. However, we acknowledge that the specific
setting in which we situate our study may limit the
scope of our findings and that status considerations
may operate differently in other domains.
Finally, we return to an issue inherent in our decision
to manipulate status at the level of groups rather than
individuals. We have motivated this design choice as
conceptually appropriate given our theoretical frame-
work, but we acknowledge that it potentially compro-
mises our ability to causally identify a status effect as
status could be correlated with other group-level differ-
ences between Germans and other immigrants. We have
attempted to mitigate these concerns by drawing upon
our pre-experimental survey results as well as related lit-
erature (Helbling, 2011). However, future work could
build upon our design to definitively address these issues
(e.g., by manipulating status simultaneously at the indi-
vidual- and group-levels).
General Discussion
Our article contributes to a large body of research on
the consequences of diversity for social cohesion by pre-
senting a direct test of the oft-cited, though rarely exam-
ined, proposition that prosocial behaviour in
multiethnic settings is ethnically-bounded. Results from
a field experiment involving Swiss train commuters dem-
onstrate evidence of bias against both high-status and
low-status immigrant groups, although the ethnic pen-
alty is substantially larger and statistically more robust
for the latter. Further exploratory analyses indicate that
our results are driven by the subset of interventions in
which commuters could plausibly justify withholding as-
sistance, suggesting that situational factors shaping the
‘costs’ of discrimination play an important role in mod-
erating patterns of anti-immigrant bias.
One important implication of these findings is to
highlight variation in discrimination against different
ethnic minority groups. These differences are often over-
looked in extant research on the consequences of diver-
sity which tends to treat all immigrants in monolithic,
undifferentiated terms. Our work indicates that such dif-
ferences not only matter for shaping immigration-related
attitudes (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013;
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Turper et al., 2015;
Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016; Czymara
and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017;
Diehl et al., 2018; Ward, 2019), but also hold real behav-
ioural consequences in interpersonal encounters. More
broadly in relation to the ethnic diversity literature, our
results suggest that individuals’ tendency to condition
prosocial behaviour on ethnicity may indeed contribute
to the oft-cited negative association between diversity
and collective outcomes, although the anti-foreigner pen-
alty seems to be largely driven by natives’ adverse reac-
tions towards stereotypically low-status immigrants.
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Recognizing the importance of differentiating between
immigrant groups also implies a methodological rethink-
ing of how scholars choose to operationalize diversity in
empirical research. Currently, the most common ap-
proach is to measure diversity using indexes of ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization (ELF).18 By construction,
however, ELF is ‘color-blind’, in that a neighbourhood
which is composed of 70 per cent Swiss and 30 per cent
Germans is considered identical to a neighbourhood com-
posed of 70 per cent Swiss and 30 per cent Albanians (for
similar critiques, see Abascal and Baldassarri, 2015;
Kustov and Pardelli 2018; Winter and Zhang, 2018). Yet,
our results suggest that patterns of prosocial behaviour
would be quite different across these areas. Capturing
these differences would require researchers to move be-
yond aggregate diversity indexes and focus instead on the
specific composition of foreign residents in multiethnic
communities (Be´cares et al., 2011; Laurence, 2011;
Bakker and Dekker, 2012; Gundelach and Traunmu¨ller,
2014; Kustov and Pardelli, 2018).
A secondary implication relates to our finding that
discrimination is only discernable in interventions where
confederates could plausibly deny carrying a mobile
phone. In these circumstances, it appears that situational
factors provide an opening to engage in discriminatory
behaviour. This explanation resonates with seminal find-
ings from sociology and social psychology showing that
prejudicial attitudes are more likely to manifest in behav-
iour when the costs of discriminating are low (Merton,
1948; Crosby, Bromley and Saxe, 1980; Duckitt, 1992).
In contrast, when the costs are high (as in the case of
commuters holding cell phones), social desirability may
pressure individuals to act civically despite their private
inclinations to the contrary. Our results therefore high-
light the role of situational factors in mediating the map-
ping between preferences (in this case, to avoid helping
foreigners) and actions. Building from this finding, future
research could more fully explore additional influences
on the ‘costs’ of discrimination which may potentially in-
hibit the expression of anti-foreigner sentiment in native-
immigrant encounters.
Future work may also extend the present study by
examining how immigrants’ behaviour is influenced by
the ethnicity of one’s interaction partners. More re-
search taking account of immigrants’ perspectives is
needed since immigrants make up a large proportion of
potential interaction partners in multiethnic neighbour-
hoods and thus contribute significantly to overall pat-
terns of solidarity and cooperation. Moreover, it is
possible that immigrants act more prosocially towards
other immigrants, thereby partially compensating for
the negative reactions of natives and cushioning the
overall detrimental effects of diversity on collective out-
comes.19 That said, our exploratory analysis suggests
this not to be the case: if anything, non-native commut-
ers appear to reproduce the discriminatory patterns we
observe amongst natives. These findings resonate instead
with research in social psychology showing that the eth-
nic or racial hierarchies articulated by the dominant
group tend to become embedded in society more broadly
and even accepted by members of subordinate groups
(Hagendoorn, 1995; Sidanius and Pratto, 2001;
Snellman and Ekehammar, 2005). Future research could
address these issues more definitively by employing
larger non-native samples.
The present paper sidesteps these issues by examin-
ing how ethnicity shapes natives’ behaviour.
Accordingly, our analysis focuses on anti-immigrant
discrimination as a key challenge to the cohesiveness
of contemporary multiethnic societies. Here, it is im-
portant to highlight that the discrimination we docu-
ment occurs in the context of anonymous, one-shot
interactions. However, research drawing from theories
of intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and
Tropp, 2006) has shown that the negative effects of
diversity can be significantly mitigated via meaningful
and sustained cross-ethnic interaction (Marschall and
Stolle, 2004; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, 2008). By
extension, future research might fruitfully investigate
whether the patterns of discrimination we uncover
also obtain in other types of encounters (e.g. between
coworkers, schoolmates, or neighbours) which are nei-
ther anonymous nor one-shot.
Finally, although we provide evidence in support of a
key theoretical mechanism linking immigration to un-
desirable collective outcomes, we do not read our results
to advocate for the benefits of ethnic homogeneity over
diversity. Importantly, it is widely acknowledged that di-
versity contributes positively to economic growth, innov-
ation, and competitiveness, and that immigration to
advanced-industrial countries is needed to offset the
impending fiscal effects of aging populations (Surowiecki,
2005; Putnam, 2007; Page, 2008; Lorenz et al., 2011).
We believe that it is vitally important to keep sight of
these benefits in the current debate about the consequen-
ces of diversity for contemporary European societies.
Notes
1 Other studies do test this proposition as applied to
inter-group relations more broadly via behavioural
experiments involving inter-alia Ashkenazi versus
Eastern Jews in Israel (Ferschtman and Gneezy,
2001); Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia
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(Whitt and Wilson, 2007); Ugandan ethnic groups
(Habyarimana et al., 2007), and blacks and whites
in the United States (Abascal, 2015; Simpson,
McGrimmon and Irwin, 2007).
2 In addition to studies focusing directly on proso-
ciality, there is also a vast field experimental litera-
ture on discrimination in housing and employment
(see Auspurg, Schneck and Hinz 2019; Zschirnt
and Ruedin, 2016).
3 For example, Posner (2004) shows how the activity
of political entrepreneurs renders the cultural cleav-
age between the Chewa and Tumbuka peoples a
highly salient ethnic boundary in Malawi, while the
same cultural division holds little significance in
neighbouring Zambia where a different political
calculus prevails.
4 For instance, the passage of the referendum ‘against
mass immigration’ (Eidgeno¨ssische Volksinitiative
‘Gegen Masseneinwanderung’) in 2014 was tar-
geted primarily towards limiting the free movement
of EU citizens to Switzerland.
5 However, this effect only appears when the enve-
lopes contained money, such that finders of the lost
letters had an incentive to keep the mail. Without
financial incentives, the return rates for Muslim
and Swedish recipients was similar. Similar (null)
results are reported from un-incentivized lost letter
experiments in Berlin (Koopmans and Veit, 2014)
and Zurich (Diekmann et al., 2014).
6 In addition to the studies listed in Footnote 1, see also
Abascal (2015) and Bobo and Hutchings (1996).
7 Specifically, confederates we instructed to alternate
between platforms after every intervention. This
procedure was designed to ensure that a new trial
was not begun on the same platform until the train
arrived and the platform was cleared of passengers.
Upon entering the platform, confederates initiated
the intervention by approaching the first single per-
son they encountered.
8 The name of one of the co-authors was used. The
number we showed corresponded to an actual land-
line at the University of Zurich. However, the
phone was physically disconnected in order to
avoid registering and recording incoming calls. In
order to ensure that commuters understood that the
call would be placed to a local number, confeder-
ates were explicitly instructed to state their request
to borrow a phone only after clarifying that they
had a local appointment. This procedure was
designed to ensure that commuters would not
worry about incurring potentially high costs for a
non-local call. This was particularly relevant in
trials involving low-status immigrants where
commuters could otherwise have been apprehen-
sive about a potentially expensive phone call
abroad.
9 Although the vast majority of Swiss residents own
mobile phones (Y&R Group, 2017), we cannot ex-
clude the possibility that commuters not holding
phones when approached by confederates may
genuinely not have a phone with them. This pro-
vides an additional reason to control for phone visi-
bility in our analyses. We are grateful to an
anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
10 Importantly, we instructed confederates to avoid
using either Italian or French accents, as these could
be associated with autochthonous language groups
from other parts of Switzerland.
11 We employed a version of the common MacArthur
Scale of Subject Social Status, in which respond-
ents were presented with a picture of a 10-step lad-
der, along with the following text: ‘Think of this
ladder as representing where people stand in
Switzerland. At the top of the ladder are people
who are the best off – those who have the most
money, the most education and the most respected
jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the
worst off – who have the least money, least educa-
tion, and the least respected jobs or no job. The
higher up one is on this ladder, the closer they are
to the people at the very top; the lower one is, the
closer they are to the people at the very bottom.
Where would you place [the confederate] on this
ladder’?
12 Replication data and code for all analyses reported
in the main text and Supplementary Materials are
available through the Open Science Framework at
https://osf.io/9tnmf/. DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/
9TNMF
13 We adapted this question from the American
National Election Survey feeling thermometer.
Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate
their feelings towards confederates using a therm-
ometer degree measure. Higher scores represent
warm or favourable feelings, and lower scores rep-
resent cold or unfavourable feelings.
14 To directly examine this possibility, we con-
ducted online pretests in which respondents were
exposed to a short, randomly selected sound sam-
ple employing either (i) Schweizerdeutsch, (ii)
Hochdeutsch, (iii) an Italian accent, (iv) a
Spanish accent, (v) an Arabic accent, or (vi) an
Eastern-European accent. Respondents were then
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presented with a list of statements and asked to
select the statement corresponding to the sound
sample they just heard. Roughly 80–90 per cent
of respondents identified the correct statement
regardless of the accent employed in the sound
sample, and a chi-squared test reveals no signifi-
cant differences across the six treatment condi-
tions (results not shown). Thus, based on our
pretests, we do not believe that commuters
would have problems understanding confeder-
ates in the field simply because a foreign accent
was used.
15 Following Mood (2010), we opt for LPM in the
main text to facilitate the presentation of our
results. Supplementary Table S14 replicates our
main results using logistic regressions.
16 Strictly speaking, lower helping rates obtaining in
the ‘Phone not visible’ condition could also result
from the fact that commuters might genuinely not
have a phone with them. See footnote 9.
17 In addition to 863 interventions involving native
Swiss commuters, we also coded 310 interventions
involving non-Swiss commuters, as well as 25 inter-
ventions where we could not confidently assess the
commuter’s background.
18 ELF is commonly interpreted as measuring the
probability that two randomly drawn individuals
from a population will belong to different ethnic
groups (Fearon, 2003).
19 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for rais-
ing this point.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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